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ABSTRACT
The Heidelberg Catechism’s section on Sin and Misery does not provide a moralistic 
or legalistic perspective on the human condition. Instead, it offers, in abbreviated 
format, a restatement of the doctrine of original sin, which points to sin as a 
condition and not just an act. As such, it invites us to think more deeply about the 
complexities of the human condition and of human agency.
1. INTRODUCTION
Among the Reformed confessions of faith, I have had a particular fondness 
for the Heidelberg Catechism since childhood. I like it, first of all, because 
of the introductory question and answer: “What is your only comfort in 
life and in death? That I, with body and soul, both in life and in death, am 
not my own, but belong to my faithful Savior Jesus Christ ...”1 This starts 
the Heidelberg Catechism on a very personal angle which permeates the 
dogma that will follow. The Heidelberg Catechism is therefore not dry 
teaching, but warm, pastoral consolation. 
This document also appeals to me because of its strong ethical bent: 
the huge focus on the life of gratitude that follows on the redemption we 
receive in Christ spoke to my young heart while living in a country where we 
were faced by huge ethical challenges due to the injustices of the apartheid 
system, and that focus has remained integral to my understanding of 
1 The Heidelberg Catechism, first published in 1563, consists of two introductory 
questions and answers, and then three main sections: On Human Misery 
(3-11), Redemption (12-85), and Thankfulness (86-129). As such, it provides a 
basic Reformed perspective of the gospel of Jesus Christ. The main author is 
believed to be Zacharias Ursinus.
Acta Theologica 






THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM ON 
HUMAN SIN AND MISERY
Dr. Rachel Sophia Baard, Villanova University, Philadelphia, USA; University of 
Stellenbosch, South Africa. E-mail: rachel.baard@villanova.edu
Produced by SUN MeDIA Bloemfontein
Acta Theologica Supplementum 20 2014
87
theology. As a child, the actual content of the section on gratitude in the 
Heidelberg Catechism was not as important to me, but the fact that it was 
there, that it presented ethics as part of faith, was significant to me. It 
taught me that Christianity is not just about my personal salvation, but 
about a life transformed by the grace of God. With this emphasis on the life 
of sanctification, the Heidelberg Catechism retains its personal angle – as 
such, it is not just about what we know and believe, but about how we 
live our lives. So, in short, since childhood I have liked the Heidelberg 
Catechism for its personal and practical nature.
The section on sin and misery, on the other hand, was not always quite 
so appealing. It was a section to just go over, a sort of preamble before 
getting to the good stuff of grace. Indeed, it would seem that Ursinus also 
thought so, for this is the shortest of the three content sections. Moreover, 
the language used in this section has also often struck readers as being 
rather moralistic in tone, quite distinct from the pastoral and practical tone 
found elsewhere in the Catechism. 
In what follows, I want to challenge both this aversion to talking 
about sin, and the accusation that the Heidelberg Catechism’s treatment 
of sin has a moralistic tone. More specifically, by focusing on particular 
biblical texts cited in this section, I will point out that despite some 
rhetorical, doctrinal and scriptural problems in this section, the Heidelberg 
Catechism’s presentation of the human situation invites us to think anew 
about the human situation from a pastoral and practical standpoint.
2. REFLECTING ON HUMAN SIN AND MISERY AS 
A THEOLOGICAL TASK
There is something quite Reformed about not wanting to focus much on 
sin and misery. The Christian life is a life rooted in the grace of God in 
Christ and lived daily by the grace of God, coram Deo, and for that reason 
the second and third sections of the Heidelberg Catechism, where the 
focus is on the justification and sanctification of the Christian, are in a 
certain sense far more important than the first. Sin should indeed never 
be the centre of the gospel of grace, nor something we should dwell on 
in our lives as Christians. That all too easily leads to self-centeredness 
and moralism. The Reformation is, after all, historically rooted in Luther’s 
recognition that an obsessive dwelling on one’s personal sins is the very 
antithesis of the life that God wants for us. A heavy focus on sin can so 
easily be sinful, in that it leads us towards ourselves, and as Augustine 
and later Luther taught, to turn inward and be concerned with our own 
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well-being too much, to be incurvatus in se, is to sin. As such, ironically, to 
dwell on sin can become sinful!
Nevertheless, the gospel does not bypass sin, and the Reformed 
Christian needs to take the concept of sin very seriously, even if we are 
not to dwell on it. There are three reasons for this: first, sin-talk is not the 
same as moralism; second, sin-talk is intertwined with grace; and third, we 
have an ethical responsibility to talk of human sin and misery. A few brief 
comments on each of these.
First, sin-talk is not about a list of do’s and don’ts. I will point out below 
that even when the concept of law enters the picture as that which convicts 
us of sin, that still does not mean that sin is a simple matter of transgressing 
legal norms. The original heading for this first content section is not “Sin 
and Misery” (as it is often translated) but “Von Menschen Elend,” i.e., 
“On Human Misery.” Human misery, notes Dirkie Smit (2013:173-188), is 
more condition than act, something for which we are to be pitied rather 
than something of which we are to be accused. However, this does not 
mean that we ought to replace the language of sin with the language 
of misery. These are not mutually exclusive categories. What we need 
to do is to talk more deeply about the doctrine of original sin, which is 
Christianity’s own antidote to the language of moralism. In affirming the 
concept of a fundamental brokenness in our humanity that precedes any 
actual decisions to commit wrongdoing, the Christian doctrine of original 
sin speaks the language of human misery, and not simply the language of 
moralism. More about that below.
The second reason why we cannot just skip this section and go to 
the “good stuff” of grace, is that theologically, you cannot speak of 
grace without also speaking of sin. Although, as noted, the Heidelberg 
Catechism omits the explicit use of the term “sin” in the title of its first 
content section, it does employ that term in Answer 2 when it presents 
knowledge of our sin and misery as the first step in knowing the work of 
Christ in our lives. Moreover, clearly sin is the reason why we are in need 
of justification and sanctification. So, much as we might like to bypass 
sin-talk, it is not theologically sound, although of course, how one speaks 
of sin is very important. It is necessary to talk of sin in relation to grace. 
Reformed theologian Serene Jones (2000: 95) argues that sin-talk should 
not be part of our discussion of the doctrine of creation, but rather part of 
our discussion of soteriology. This would imply that we should not talk of 
sin as if it is part of our identity. On the contrary, sin is our anti-identity. 
Our true identity is in Christ, and it is only in the light of this true identity 
that our sin can be fully understood. As such, all talk of sin should be 
subsumed under talk of grace. Moreover, the concept of sin has what Mary 
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McClintock Fulkerson (1991:657) calls a “theocentric grammar,” which 
invites us to look at sin in terms of our fundamental alienation from God. 
And if sin-talk is therefore inseparable from talking about God, then it is 
inseparable from talking about grace, since the God who is revealed in 
Jesus Christ is the God of grace, is what Catherine Mowry LaCugna (1993) 
called, God-For-Us. 
The third reason why we cannot bypass sin-talk is because it is our 
ethical responsibility to talk about sin. We cannot reduce the gospel of 
grace to one of cheap grace, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer so famously remarked. 
We cannot ignore the human condition of sin and misery and hop, skip, 
and jump to grace. The love command, that very law that the Heidelberg 
Catechism says we break when we sin, that very law which provides the 
basic guideline to the sanctified life, requires us to take seriously the 
question of human sin and misery. If sin and misery are things to be pitied 
for, then pity for ourselves and our fellow human beings need to be present 
in our hearts, a pity that calls us to desire the one who heals our misery, 
the one whose grace transforms our brokenness into wholeness, and a 
pity that moves us to live lives of justice, of taking care of the poor and the 
suffering, of protest against systems of power and oppression that crush 
the human spirit and break human bodies.
So, sin-talk, although always risky, is also a Christian responsibility. 
Alistair McFadyen points out that the trivialization of the concept of sin in 
modern Western culture reflects the fact that “sin” has ceased to function 
as a way of talking about the pathological in human affairs. The aim of 
sin-talk, he says, is to speak of concrete pathologies in relation to God 
(McFadyen 2000:3-5). Reflection on sin, when it transcends moralism and 
the blame game, is reflection on the human condition, on human misery in 
all its concreteness. It is reflection on our alienation from our true selves, 
from each other, from the source of our being. However, it is also reflection 
on the ills that are expressions of this alienation: violence, war, racism, 
oppression, sexism, heterosexism, greed, abuse… The word of grace that 
comes to us in Christ speaks into this misery, this world, these concrete 
pathologies. The Christian cannot bypass reflection on these dark matters. 
This is particularly true when we reflect on the ills that befall others. I refuse 
to bypass talk of sin in a world where there are more slaves today than ever 
before, where millions of women are raped and beaten daily, where millions 
are starving.2 And when I utter the language of sin, including the liberation 
2 According to the first modern global survey on slavery, there are currently 
close to 30 million slaves in the world (despite its illegality). This is more 
than in 1860, when slavery was still legal in some countries. See http://www.
globalslaveryindex.org. Accessed August 12, 2014. 
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theology language of structural sin, I do so in the knowledge that the roots 
that “have born such terrible fruit lie also within me” (Busch 2010:81).
So, to conclude my prolegomena before I turn to content: if sin is not 
just a matter of individual acts of moral indiscretion and sin-talk thus not 
a matter of moralistic preaching; and if sin-talk is theologically intertwined 
with talk of grace; and if there is an ethical responsibility to reflect on 
the concrete sin and misery that is part of the human condition; then we 
cannot bypass this section on human sin and misery in the Heidelberg 
Catechism. Which leads us to the question: what does the Heidelberg 
Catechism say in its brief section on human sin and misery? And, does it 
still have something to say to us today?
3. THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM ON HUMAN SIN 
AND MISERY
In Answer 2 of the Heidelberg Catechism, sin is introduced as the first of 
three things that one must know in order to know the comfort of Christ 
in life and in death. Then, in the section called “On Human Misery,” the 
Heidelberg Catechism presents a simple argument: we come to know our 
misery through the law (Q&A 3), that law which requires us to love God 
and neighbour (Q&A 4). We find that we cannot live according to this law, 
since we have a “natural tendency” to hate God and neighbour (Q&A 5). 
This tendency was not part of God’s original creation, since God creates 
us in God’s image (Q&A 6), but it is the result of the Fall (Q&A 7). Now we 
are totally unable to do any good unless we are born again by the Spirit 
of God (Q&A 8). The section ends with 3 questions around the justice and 
mercy of God (Q&A 9-11), and thus the table is set to introduce the good 
news of Jesus Christ.
3.1. Law and grace: Romans 7 and Matthew 22
Obviously I cannot do justice to the whole section On Human Misery, but I 
want to pause at a few moments that stood out to me in rereading it, with 
specific focus on some of the text references. First, in answer 3, while 
the original edition references Romans 3:20, later editions also reference 
Romans 7:7-25 (specifically v. 7), which state that the consciousness of 
sin comes through the law. Romans 7 is interesting in this regard, because 
when it introduces the law as the mirror in which we see our sin, it does so 
in the context of an emphasis on human helplessness in being in the grip 
of sin, of a binding of the free will: “for I do not the good I want, but I do 
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the evil that I do not want” (7:19).3 This passage expresses something of 
the existential experience that played a role in Augustine’s development of 
the doctrine of original sin. The text suggests that the hold of sin is more 
radical than a mere list of moral do’s and don’ts would suggest, that it is 
something that we are in the grip of, and not merely something that we 
choose. Of course Ursinus’ point in this answer was to claim that the law 
convicts us of sin, and not yet to speak of original sin – that will come later. 
But this text is interesting, nonetheless, since it indicates that biblically 
speaking, the sin that we see in the mirror of the law is not a simple matter 
of legalistic transgressions. This is further highlighted by the summary of 
the law in Matthew 22, which is referenced in the actual text of Question 
and Answer 22. 
Matthew 22 summarizes the law of God as the command to love God 
with all your heart and all your soul and all your mind and all your strength, 
and to love your neighbour as yourself. The accompanying texts from the 
Old Testament are Deut. 6:5, which speaks of loving God with all your 
heart, all your soul, and all your strength, and Lev. 19:18, which contains 
the command to love your neighbour as yourself. I suspect that not many 
Christians know that the summary of the law that we get from Jesus is 
based on direct references to the Hebrew Bible. I do not want to make 
too much of this, and I certainly do not wish to get into the intricacies 
of questions about continuity between Old Testament law and the New 
Testament, but I do think it is very interesting that the Heidelberg Catechism 
here references these Old Testament texts and not only the one from the 
New Testament. Perhaps it intrigued me because of my Reformed desire 
to emphasize the continuity, rather than the discontinuity, between the 
Old and the New Testament. I also find this particularly significant given 
Christianity’s sad history of anti-Semitism, which is at least partially rooted 
in a reading of Jesus as being the antithesis of Judaism. Modern historical 
Jesus scholarship has helped us to understand more clearly how deeply 
rooted Jesus was in Judaism, and how much his particular emphases were 
already found in Judaism. In Christ non-Jews become the people of God 
as well, but the God who is revealed in Jesus, is the God who is revealed 
in the Torah. A greater sensitivity to Judaism teaches us that the law is 
seen not as a set of legal rules, but as God’s gracious gift to humanity. 
When Christianity teaches that the law is fulfilled in Christ, and that not all 
3 This suggestion that our will is not free, but bound to sin seems to be in tension 
with Romans 6, where Paul says that we are no longer slaves to sin. The 
traditional Protestant way of expressing this existential tension is Luther’s simul 
iustus et peccator, the insight that we are free from sin, justified by the grace 
of God, clothed in the alien righteousness of Christ, even as we yet struggle to 
overcome the reality of sin in our lives, a struggle which is part of our misery. 
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of the ritual aspects of it need to be kept anymore, it surely is not saying 
that God’s grace is the direct antithesis of the law. Or at least, from a 
Reformed perspective, it ought not to say that. Reformed theology, unlike 
the Lutheran tradition, does not see a strong juxtaposition between law 
and grace. Law is from grace, and indeed it is grace. So, the law which is 
an expression of God’s grace sheds light on our human condition of sin 
and misery. Grace is not still waiting to show up after the law has convicted 
us of sin. It is already here in the law. Our sin is seen not through the lens 
of something that is the antithesis of God’s grace, so that we can rush 
towards that grace out of fear. No, indeed, the law is already God’s grace 
coming to us. Our sin thus becomes known to us in light of God’s grace as 
expressed in the law.
3.2. Original sin: Genesis 3
So, the sin that is mirrored in the law is not a simple matter of a set of rules 
that have been transgressed, but of an existential problem. This insight 
finds classical expression in the Christian doctrine of original sin. The 
Heidelberg Catechism includes this doctrine in abbreviated form, and with 
specific reference to Genesis 3, in Question and Answer 5-7. This section is, 
however, problematic from a rhetorical, doctrinal, and scriptural standpoint. 
Answer 5 argues that we do not live up to the double love command, 
but have a “natural tendency” to hate God and our neighbours. This is a 
rhetorically unfortunate way to look at the problem, because most people 
would not recognize a feeling quite as strong as hate in themselves – even 
when we hate, we usually don’t attribute it to something natural, but to that 
particular person or group’s behaviour (whether this is in fact true or not). 
Thus the phrase needs explanation – hate does not mean a strong emotion 
here, but a basic condition of being turned in towards ourselves rather 
than to God and our fellow human beings. In short, the phrase needs to 
be understood against the backdrop of Augustine’s understanding that sin 
implies three basic moves: the move toward ourselves, which he calls pride, 
a move away from God, i.e., rebellion against God, and a move towards 
the things of this world, or concupiscence (civ. Dei 14.11, 13 etc.). Talk 
of a “natural tendency” to hate God and neighbour does not adequately 
convey that. 
Moreover, the phrase “by nature” in Answer 5 is doctrinally problematic, 
because the doctrine of original sin makes clear that sin is not natural, 
i.e., not part of the nature that God had created in us, but is indeed a 
deformation of the goodness that is our natural condition. In my view 
the Heidelberg Catechism comes close to stumbling here in Answer 5, 
because, in trying to convey one of the basic insights of the doctrine of 
Acta Theologica Supplementum 20 2014
93
original sin, namely Augustine’s anti-Pelagian insistence that sin is not 
just a matter of individual immorality, but indeed a fundamental human 
problem, something with which we are born, the Heidelberg Catechism 
almost suggests that sin is our natural condition. Of course, in a certain 
sense it is, but it is not part of nature as God created it, but a distortion 
of nature. The Heidelberg Catechism then comes to its own rescue in 
Answers 6 and 7, where it reiterates Augustine’s insistence that God did 
not create us in this manner, but that this deep flaw in human nature is 
transmitted to us from our primeval ancestors. 
While the Heidelberg Catechism here clarifies potential doctrinal 
misunderstandings that might have arisen from Answer 5, we as modern 
readers now run into a different problem, the problem of scriptural 
interpretation. The story of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden found 
in Genesis 3, referenced in Question and Answer 7, is a problematic one 
today, since a literal reading of this story is now only possible within the 
fundamentalist corners of Christianity. Moreover, we also know from 
interaction with Judaism that Genesis 3 was not traditionally read as a 
story of a primeval human fall from grace. This begs the question: does 
the doctrine of original sin depend on a traditional reading of Genesis 3? 
Without pretending to provide a full answer to this conundrum, I want to 
make a few remarks about the polemical situation out of which the doctrine 
developed, the influence of other biblical passages besides Gen.3, the 
influence of church practices, and the existential insights contained in this 
doctrine. Together, these things suggest that there is a lot more to the 
doctrine of original sin than the story of Adam and Eve.
3.2.1. Polemical situation
Although most scholars recognize the influence of earlier layers of the 
tradition in Augustine’s formulation of the doctrine of original sin, it was 
undeniably in Augustine that the idea of a universal sinfulness, rooted in 
a historical event, flowered into a full-blown doctrine (Wiley 2002:37-75). 
Jaroslav Pelikan points out that this should be at least partially attributed to 
a changing polemical context during Augustine’s lifetime. In the centuries 
before Augustine, and indeed well into his own lifetime, the polemical 
situation in which Christian theologians operated was characterized by 
deterministic explanations of the human predicament, such as Gnosticism 
and Manichaeism. As a result of the emphasis on the inevitability of sin and 
evil in these thought systems, Christian theologians found it necessary to 
emphasize human responsibility for sin and evil (Pelikan 1971:280-284). 
Augustine himself, in his polemics against the Manicheans, upheld human 
responsibility for sin. Yet in his response to Pelagius, Augustine had to 
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equally uphold the other side of the dialectic, that of the inevitability of 
sinful choices. 
Pelagius, as is well known, was of the opinion that people are born in a 
condition of freedom from any sinful tendencies that would inevitably result 
in sin, and thus sin consists only of separate acts of the will, depending 
in each case on the voluntary choice of the person. Within this view, the 
very fact that God commands the good is proof that human beings are 
capable of it. If sin is nonetheless universal, as Pelagius admitted, it is 
due to wrong education, bad example, and longstanding habits of sinning 
(Berkhof 1937:132-133).
Although Augustine’s formulation of the doctrine of original sin cannot 
be reduced to a reaction to Pelagius, it cannot be denied that Pelagius’ 
thought on sin (at least as this was understood by Augustine!) provided 
the most important historical impetus for Augustine’s development of 
the doctrine of original sin. Given this polemical situation, it becomes 
pretty clear that the doctrine of original sin was not simply a result of an 
interpretation of Genesis 3. 
3.2.2. Other biblical texts
Other biblical texts, including Romans 7 and 9, 1 Corinthians 15, and 
perhaps a mistranslated Romans 5:12, also played a role (Wiley 2002:49-52). 
Take, for example, Romans 7’s insistence that we do not merely commit 
sin, but are enslaved by it, that our will is not in full control of our actions, 
that indeed we often do what we do not wish to do, and it becomes 
abundantly clear that Genesis 3 is not the only significant biblical text in 
the development of the doctrine of original sin.
3.2.3. Church practices
Apart from the polemical situation and the influence of multiple scriptural 
passages, the doctrine of original sin also arose in response to certain 
practices and ideas in Christianity that had already developed at that 
stage. Doctrine often follows upon practice, and not vice versa, much 
as we would like to pretend otherwise! One of the influences at the time 
was the emergence of infant baptism. It was from Cyprian that Augustine 
drew the argument that the practice of infant baptism “proved the 
presence in infants of a sin that was inevitable, but a sin for which they 
were nevertheless held responsible” (Pelikan 1971:292). It is important 
to recognize that the doctrine of original sin did not entirely originate 
with Augustine – similar ideas had gradually started to develop prior to 
Augustine. So yes, Genesis 3 most certainly played an important role, but 
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earlier layers of the tradition and developing practices in the church, led 
Augustine to affirm, in contrast to Pelagius, humanity’s bondage to sin due 
to the “Fall,” even while upholding human responsibility for actual sin. 
3.2.4. Existential insights
Finally, the doctrine of original sin expresses certain existential truths 
that go well beyond the simple story of Adam, Eve, and the eating of 
forbidden fruit. Paul Rigby (1987:7) argues that the doctrine of original sin 
was to a large extent derived from Augustine’s personal experience of sin 
and salvation, and as such it was a matter of existential, and not merely 
dogmatic or exegetical insight. I would even suggest that instead of seeing 
Genesis 3 as a source text for the doctrine of original sin, one could read 
it as expressive of the sense of alienation from self and God and other that 
we often experience in our lives. The story is therefore not a history of how 
that alienation came to be, but the story, like the doctrine, expresses an 
instinctive human awareness that things are “not the way it’s supposed to 
be” (Plantinga 1996). 
Tatha Wiley (2002:9) notes that the reduction of the meaning of the 
doctrine of original sin to the story of Adam and Eve has “overshadowed 
the fundamental reality to which Christian teaching points,” which is 
that evil “is a feature of our existence prior to our personal choices and 
decisions.” In the twentieth century, theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr 
and Paul Tillich have tried to replace the historical account of “Adam and 
Eve” and their Fall with existentialist categories. Original sin as event has 
thus receded into the background. But the issue of original sin as condition 
is more complex, for although it shifts the focus away from problematic 
literal readings of texts that really ought not to be read as such, it also 
clashes with modern sensibilities. Alistair McFadyen (2000:20-21) notes 
that the recognition of sin as “a being rather than a doing,”
… offends against the most fundamental, twin tenets of natural, 
rational and just moral order: that we are held to account only for our 
own free acts, what we have done (which are acts of our person) and 
that which we could have avoided doing. The doctrine of original 
sin posits that we inherit sin in the form of guilt for others’ actions; 
that there has been a total and universal moral collapse which make 
avoidance of sin impossible; and that we are yet accountable for 
this situation and for our individual acts of sin which this situation 
preconditions us to commit.4
4 I should note that I don’t think describing Augustine’s view of sin as “a being 
rather than a doing” is adequate, since Augustine also emphasized human 
responsibility for sin in his polemics against the Manicheans, and his rejection 
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Part of the problem here is that we often operate with an individualistic 
understanding of moral agency. There is also too much of a focus on 
the issue of blame: instead of recognizing human misery and of taking 
responsibility, we tend to blame others (often gleefully) or wallow in feelings 
of guilt about our own sins. Many modern Christians are de facto Pelagians, 
with an insufficient understanding of the fact that we are imbedded in, 
situated in, indeed formed by, each other, including each other’s sin and 
misery. The doctrine of original sin offends because it is often read from 
a moralistic standpoint, as if it blames people for something they did not 
do. There is an insufficient understanding of the fact that it expresses our 
brokenness. There is something really profound in Augustine’s insight 
that we are born with this, and that it nevertheless is ours. As Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1989:288) put it, sin is 
common to all; not something that pertains severally to each 
individual and exists in relation to him by himself, but in each the 
work of all, and in all the work of each; and only in this corporate 
character indeed, can it be properly and fully understood. 
Alistair McFadyen’s analysis is helpful to summarize the basic human 
insights of the doctrine of original sin. He says that sin, in this view, is 
contingent, radical, communicable, and universal (McFadyen, 2002:16) 
In other words, the doctrine of original sin says, first of all, that human 
beings were not created sinful, but that sin is a distortion and not an 
expression of human nature. Sin is a contingent reality, not a necessary 
part of creation. The doctrine, secondly, holds that sin’s reality and hold on 
people are radical. As such, sin is primarily a serious situation in which we 
find ourselves, and only secondarily an individual act. Thirdly, sin effects 
a fundamental distortion of the conditions of sociality through which we 
are “called into personhood.” Thus, before we are capable of performing 
morally culpable acts, sin constructs our very personhood. This distorted 
reality may be expressed in terms of alienation from the divine and each 
other – that which the Heidelberg Catechism so unfortunately calls “a 
natural tendency to hate God and neighbour.” Finally, this distorted 
reality is universally extensive, both as a condition and as an actualizing 
possibility. McFadyen writes that this universality of sinning represents 
more than the claim that no-one so far has avoided actually committing 
sin – which would be a Pelagian argument. Instead, the doctrine of original 
sin implies 
of an ontology of evil would also, in my view, preclude a description of the 
related concept of sin as a “being rather than doing.” The language is just 
unfortunate there. Perhaps something like “a condition that leads to a doing” 
might be better.
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a universal solidarity in sin which is certainly exhibited in, but is 
neither simply the product of nor reducible to, the fact that all do, in 
fact, perform sinful acts (McFadyen 2002:16-17). 
Augustine understood that the locus of sin is not the act itself – the 
act is, rather, an expression of how this particular individual participates 
in humanity’s corporate disunity with the divine. Yes, modern science and 
critical readings of the Bible make some of Augustine’s premises obsolete. 
But they cannot erase the existential truths contained in his perspective – 
the truth that we are fundamentally opaque to ourselves, that our decisions 
are shaped by our participation in the corporate reality of humanity and 
the social structures created by the human race, but that we nevertheless 
have a measure of free will and are not merely victims of fate.
4. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, is the language with which the Heidelberg Catechism 
introduces us to human sin and misery still relevant? The answer, in short, is 
yes, and no. “No” in the sense that the Catechism does sometimes fall into 
a rhetorically and doctrinally unfortunate trap when it talks of being prone 
by nature to hate God and neighbour, and “no” in the sense that resting 
the rich doctrinal insights of the doctrine of original sin on a problematic 
text like Genesis 3 simply does not hold up to scrutiny. But “yes” also. 
The Heidelberg Catechism does not offer us the language of moralism 
when it speaks of human misery – which has often been an accusation 
levelled against it. Instead, it offers us the language of original sin, however 
briefly, which invites us to move beyond moralism and into reflection on 
the complexities of human misery and human moral agency. And while 
the Heidelberg Catechism does not go into the direction of reflection on 
concrete human pathologies, I would argue that the language of original 
sin does invite us to go there as well, since it does not merely talk of sin 
as condition but also of sin as expressed in actual deeds. The Heidelberg 
Catechism furthermore invites us to think more creatively about the law 
of God, and how it is the gift of grace that shows us our brokenness, 
not to break us further, but to lead us to the One Who Heals. Despite its 
sometimes old-fashioned language, there remains a pastoral and practical 
tone in the Heidelberg Catechism, even in its reflections on human sin and 
misery. And it remains an open invitation to think further, to ponder more 
deeply, about the human situation as we experience it today.
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